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Abstract 
The study of policy change has been receiving increasing scholarly attention. Despite the 
growing number of empirical studies on policy change, the definition and measurement of 
the concept has made limited progress. In comparative environmental policy research, for 
instance, most existing large n studies rely on impact data such as pollutant emissions to 
approximate  processes  of  policy  change,  often  without  discussing  the  conceptual 
implications of this measurement approach. Against this background, this article proposes a 
new  measurement  concept  for  empirically  assessing  environmental  policy  change,  which 
conceives  of  policy  change  in  terms  of  changes  in  policy  outputs.  We  illustrate  our 
measurement concept on the basis of an original dataset covering the evolution of clean air 
policies in 24 advanced democracies over a period of almost three decades (1976-2003). In 
a second step,  we evaluate the relationship  between our measurement of environmental 
policy change and standard emission data representing the most widely used proxy in the 
literature. Our findings suggest that clean air policies cannot be consistently associated with 
emission levels, therefore calling into question the viability of environmental impact data for 
the study of the determinants of policy change. 
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I.   Introduction 
The analysis and explanation of what governments decide to do (or not to do) has always 
been at the heart of political science. This holds particularly true for the sub-discipline of 
public  policy,  given  its  focus  on  policy  dynamics  and  the  conditions  facilitating  or 
constraining. It is hence hardly surprising that there is an on-going debate about how to 
conceptualize  and  explain  policy  change  (Baumgartner  &  Jones  1991;  Radaelli  1997; 
Richardson  2000;  John  2003;  Capano  &  Howlett  2009;  Howlett  &  Cashore  2009; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Howlett & Joshi-Koop 2011; Jacob & Jörgens 2011). At the same 
time, however, the predominant conceptual and theoretical focus on policy change comes 
along with limited attention paid to the question of how to empirically test the – partly quite 
complex  –  theoretical  propositions.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  a  lack  of  empirical 
assessments  of  policy  change.  However,  empirical  findings  are  rarely  systematically 
interpreted in the light of existing theoretical and conceptual approaches. One of the most 
important  deficits  in  this  regard  refers  to  the  lacking  critical  reflection  of  the  theoretical 
consequences that arise from the manner in which policy change is empirically assessed. 
This mismatch between theory and data used for their empirical test has been identified as 
an impediment to scientific progress in this field of inquiry (Howlett & Cashore 2009). 
These  problems  are  particularly  pronounced  in  the  analysis  of  policy  change  in  the 
environmental  field.  Especially  large-n  studies  on  environmental  policy  change  are 
characterized by a discrepancy between the way in which they measure policy change and 
the  factors  they  employ  to  provide  for  a  theoretically  informed  explanation.  While  the 
theoretically-derived causes of policy change (e.g. the number of veto players, the policy 
positions  of  the  government  and  legislature,  problem  pressure,  or  socio-economic 
conditions) are expected to affect governmental action and hence changes in environmental 
regulations, the measurement of change often relies on environmental impacts, for example, 
pollutant emissions or pollution levels. The measurement approach is typically inspired by 
the  unavailability  of  direct  measurements  of  governmental  action.  In  short,  theories 
accounting for change in policy outputs are tested by using data on policy impacts. It is either 
implicitly assumed that impact data constitute a valid proxy for policy outputs or that the 
theoretical causes of policy output change and policy impact change are more or less the 
same. This approach, however, entails the risk of producing misleading findings as policy 
impacts are usually affected by a plethora of confounding factors. 
It is the objective of this article to scrutinize this discrepancy between the measurement and 
the theoretical explanation of environmental policy change. To this end, we first develop an 
alternative approach to measuring environmental policy change, which differs from existing 
concepts insofar as it assesses policy change in terms of alterations in public law-making, 
i.e. policy outputs. Second, we test whether our measurement concept can be related to 
changes in environmental impacts as this represents a precondition for using the latter as a 8 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
proxy  for  changes  in  environmental  policy  outputs.  Only  if  there  is  a  robust  causal 
relationship between the two measurements of environmental policy change, we can safely 
state that the proxies based on environmental impacts indeed provide a viable substitute for 
a direct measurement employing legislative outputs. 
Empirically,  we  focus  on  clean  air  policy,  a  prominent  subfield  in  environmental  policy 
research. In so doing, we use a new dataset compiled from changes in clean air regulations 
in 24 OECD countries over almost three decades
1. Our results show that changes in clean 
air regulation cannot be systematically related to changes in pollutant emissions, hence 
questioning  the  validity  of  impact  d ata  as  a  proxy  for  testing  theories  of  change  in 
environmental policy outputs. More generally, our findings underline that more research 
efforts should be made in the collection of policy output data in order to advance our 
theoretical understanding of environmental policy change.  
This article proceeds as follows. We first discuss existing deficits pertaining to the analysis 
and  measurement  of  environmental  policy  change.  Subsequently,  we  introduce  our 
alternative measurement concept of policy change. We f inally proceed to the empirical 
analysis of clean air policy and provide a critical reflection of the results. 
                                                       
1  The  data  were  collected  in  the  context  of  the  collaborative  project  CONSENSUS  (confronting  Social  and 
Environmental Sustainability with Economic Pressure). The project has been financed within the 7
th Framework 
Program of the European Commission. Generous research funding is gratefully acknowledged. For further details 
seehttp://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/knill/forschung-projekte/confronting-social-and-environmental-sustainability-
with-economic-pressure-balancing-trade-offs-by-policy-dismantling-consensus/team/. I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 9 
II.   Measuring environmental policy change: the dominance 
of impact data 
Many large-n comparative studies in environmental policy research have used changes in 
environmental impacts as proxies of environmental policy change (Young et al. 2008). The 
most frequently applied indicators are levels of environmental quality or aggregate data on 
pollutant emissions and degradation levels of certain environmental media, e.g. deforestation 
rates (see, e.g., Crepaz 1995; Murdoch 1997; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2003; Wälti 2004; 
Van  &  Azomahou  2007;  Perkins  &  Neumayer  2008).  However,  this  choice  is  rarely 
theoretically  motivated,  but  rather  the  result  of  data  availability  since  impact  data  are 
regularly  compiled  and  published  by  international  organizations  like  the  Organization  for 
Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) or the World Bank. 
What are the consequences of using impact data as indicators of policy change? Basically, 
there  is  a  potential  validity  problem  because  intervening  variables  cannot  sufficiently  be 
controlled for. Even though there should, in principle, be a connection between the actual 
decisions taken by governments (i.e. policy outputs) and changes in environmental quality 
(i.e.  policy  impacts),  this  relationship  might  be  influenced  by  a  multitude  of  additional 
variables (see, e.g. Neumayer 2002). It is thus a demanding task to extract the net effect of 
governmental decision on changes in environmental quality by using control variables. The 
level  of  carbon  dioxide  emissions  in  a  country,  for  instance,  may  not  only  depend  on 
economic up- and downturns – a popular control variable – but also on a range of additional 
structural variables, such as investments in energy efficiency, shifts to more or less energy-
intensive final goods, or the use of different fossil fuels and renewable energies (see, e.g., 
Aubourg et al. 2008). 
The same objection with regard to confounding factors can be made against environmental 
performance  indices  that  are  sometimes  used  in  large-n  studies  (see,  e.g.,  Jahn  1998; 
Scruggs 1999, 2002; Esty & Porter 2005; Roller 2005). Although constructing indices is a 
means  to  overcome  problems  emerging  from  a  too  narrow  conception  of  the  dependent 
variable, it does not necessarily result in a valid measurement of policy change. Rather, the 
number of confounding factors may rise with the number of environmental impact indicators 
included in the index, hence further aggravating the ‗dependent variable problem‘ (Howlett & 
Cashore 2009) in the study of environmental policy change.  
The above discussion has shown that environmental impacts are quite distant proxies of 
governmental  decisions.  For  analysts  interested  in  examining  and  explaining  changes  in 
environmental policy-making, the use of impact data therefore poses serious problems of 
validity,  which  are  only  rarely  reflected  in  the  literature  (for  notable  exceptions,  see 
Neumayer 2002; Andonova et al 2007). 10 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
A further and also hardly acknowledged problem with the use of impact data in comparative 
environmental policy research refers to their limited reliability. Usually, the generation of this 
data is based on national reporting whose measurement procedures and data quality are 
largely unknown to social scientists. For example, there are no common principles for the 
production of emission data from industrial sites at the international level (Saarinen 2003; 
see  also  Styles  et  al.  2009).  Moreover,  these  measurement  procedures  are  frequently 
subject to changes that go unnoticed.  
A final problem with environmental impact data relates to time-lags between governmental 
action and potential policy effects. It is hardly impossible to exactly determine how much time 
has to pass until, for instance, new emission standards result in lower or higher levels of 
pollution. Even though time-series analyses often use lagged explanatory variables, usually 
by one year, the exact quantification of these intervals rests constitutes an arbitrary choice 
rather than resting on a sound scientific calculation.   
In the light of these potential problems, it is striking that many environmental policy studies, 
in particular macro-quantitative ones, use impact data rather uncritically to order to examine 
theories that refer to policy output change and the behaviour of political actors. However, as 
long as systematic reflections on restrictions regarding the measurement of the dependent 
variable are not made explicit, it is difficult to assess the explanatory power, comparability, 
and reliability of different research results. I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 11 
III.   Alternative concepts of policy change 
Which  alternatives  exist  to  more  convincingly  approach  policy  change  conceptually  and 
methodologically? What are the advantages and disadvantages? This section tackles these 
questions. The conceptual and analytical ideas that are developed here are based on three 
considerations.  Firstly,  policy  change  should  be  measured  more  directly  on  the  basis  of 
policy outputs, i.e. governmental regulatory activity. Secondly, policy output measures should 
be generally conceptualized to capture events of policy change in a more detailed manner 
and to avoid focussing on single policies or policy instruments. Thirdly, concepts of policy 
change should allow for accurately assessing developments in both directions, i.e. policy 
expansion and dismantling. 
 
III.1   Environmental policy change as change in policy output 
In  contrast  to  impact  data,  the  assessment  of  policy  outputs  allows  for  the  detailed  and 
multidimensional  assessment  of  political  decisions  and  their  changes  over  time.  Policy 
outputs can, for instance, refer to basic principles or paradigms of political programmes, the 
chosen  policy  instruments,  or  the  concrete  settings  of  these  instruments  (Hall  1993). 
Environmental impact data, by contrast, cannot capture such complex structures of policy 
change. For example, emission data do not entail information about how, i.e. by means of 
which  policy  instruments  or  their  precise  calibrations,  certain  pollution  levels  have  been 
achieved  (Jordan  et  al.  2005).  This  is  a  serious  limitation  because  the  choice  of  an 
environmental policy instrument as such already represents a crucial political decision and 
significant trade-offs can arise in the choice of instruments (Goulder & Parry 2008). 
Comprehensive  assessments  of  changes  in  different  dimensions  of  environmental  policy 
output  are  predominantly  provided  by  small-n  studies  (see,  e.g.,  Hoberg  1991;  Urwin  & 
Jordan 2008; Kochtcheeva 2009; Mazmanian & Kraft 2009). In contrast, the few existing 
large-n studies analysing environmental policy outputs either concentrate on the diffusion of 
certain policy innovations, e.g. environmental impact assessments (Hironaka 2002) or new 
types of policy instruments (Tews et al. 2003), or on concrete regulatory settings, e.g. the 
maximum allowed lead content in gasoline (Fredriksson et al. 2005). By focussing on single 
policies or policy dimensions, however, these studies adopt a selective perspective on policy 
change which might lead to biased conclusions regarding the degree of change (see also 
Meseguer & Gilardi  2009). To date, there  are hardly any studies of environmental  policy 
change  that  equally  deal  with  different  environmental  policies,  instruments,  and  their 
concrete settings (for an exception, see Holzinger et al. 2008a, 2008b). 
Closely related to the dominant focus on environmental innovations is the fact that change is 
typically  defined  as  a  departure  from  the  status  quo  without  considering  the  direction  of 12 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
change.  This  way,  it  is  neglected  that  change  is  not  unidirectional,  but  can  go  into  two 
directions, i.e. expansion and dismantling. For example, the introduction of environmental 
taxes can be interpreted as expansion, while their abolishment would imply dismantling (Knill 
et al. 2009). Moreover, expansion and dismantling activities can differ across the dimensions 
under  study.  For  instance,  it  is  possible  that  states  introduce  a  variety  of  new  policy 
instruments, while, at the same time, lowering regulatory levels of existing instruments, e.g. 
the strictness of emission standards. 
How can we capture policy change in both its complexity and its innate direction on the basis 
of policy outputs? In the following, we propose a measurement concept based on a partially 
modified version of Peter Hall‘s typology of policy change (Hall 1993). On a first, very basic 
level it is analyzed whether a policy for specific target, e.g. the quality of drinking water, is in 
place. The second category relates to the instruments used to realize the respective policy 
goals, e.g. emission standards or environmental taxes. The third, most narrowly specified, 
category of policy change corresponds to the concrete setting or calibration of the applied 
instruments,  including  the  level  of,  for  instance,  emission  limits,  and  their  scope  of 
application,  that  is,  the  individuals,  organizations,  or  activities  targeted  by  a  specific 
instrument. 
This  way,  our  concept  goes  beyond  the  typology  put  forward  by  Hall  as  it  additionally 
includes  the  scope-dimension.  Moreover,  the  way  in  which  we  apply  the  measurement 
concept allows for a more nuanced empirical assessment of environmental policy change, 
since in contrast to Hall we do not limit ourselves to only pointing out instances of major or 
minor policy change, but characterize each event in the most comprehensive manner. Table 
1 illustrates how policy expansion and policy dismantling can be measured along these three 
categories. 
Table 1: The measurement of policy expansion and dismantling. 
Category  Policy Expansion  Policy Dismantling 
 
Policy presence 
 
Introduction or addition of a 
new policy 
 
 
Dismantling of an existing 
policy 
 
Policy instruments 
 
The number of policy 
instruments increases, e.g. 
information-based 
instruments are adopted  
 
 
The number of instruments 
decreases, e.g. market-
based instruments are 
abolished   
 
Policy calibration:  
Instrument levels and 
scopes 
 
Tightening regulatory 
standards or increasing the 
target group, e.g. by lowering 
emission limits 
 
 
Loosening regulatory 
standards or decreasing the 
target group, e.g. by 
increasing emission limits  I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 13 
Following these categories, it is possible to give a detailed assessment of policy change. In 
order to avoid a selective perspective on policy change, we advocate assessing policy 
change in terms aggregate developments comprising all changes in state activity within a 
policy field. This perspective can be realized by classifying and counting all events of change 
according to the aforementioned categories. 
Moreover,  we  are  able  to  identify  the  direction  of  each  event  of  change.  For  example, 
expansion in terms of policy presence takes place if a new pollutant becomes subject to 
regulatory activity. Dismantling, by contrast, would occur if a given pollutant is not regulated 
anymore. The number of policy instruments increases if a new measure to curb emissions of 
a certain pollutant, e.g. a tax, is introduced and decreases if a measure is abolished. Policy-
makers can also increase or decrease the concrete calibration of policy instruments. For 
example,  the  specific  levels  of  a  tax  as  well  as  the  target  group  of  a  tax  can  be  either 
increased or decreased. We count the first case as an event of expansion and the latter as 
an event of dismantling. 
 
III.2   Density and intensity of policy change 
Even when relying on the analytical categories of policy presence, policy instruments, and 
policy calibration, we still have to clarify how to aggregate the magnitude and direction of 
changes in a given policy field. When do we speak of policy expansion and when of policy 
dismantling?  How  do  we  assess  the  degree  of  potential  changes  in  one  or  the  other 
direction? 
For this purpose, we distinguish between two basic dimensions, namely ‗policy density‘ and 
‗policy intensity‘. The dimension of policy density describes indicates the degree of legislative 
penetration  and  internal  differentiation  of  a  policy  field.  It  hence  explores  the  number  of 
policies or instruments used within a policy field, and how this number changes over time. In 
a  complementary  vein,  policy  intensity  aims  at  measuring  the  stringency  of  the  adopted 
measures. This second dimension includes regulatory standards, such as emission limits, 
but also the scope of application of these regulations, i.e. those affected, such as specific 
industry branches.  
The concepts of policy density and policy intensity thus complement one another in their 
assessment of policy change. In this regard, it is important to note that a densely regulated 
policy field does not automatically require that the respective legal provisions are very strict 
or far-reaching and vice versa. Nevertheless, depending on the maturity of the policy field, 
changes in policy density may be accompanied by changes in intensity. A development along 
this  pattern  is  likely  for  policy  fields  in  their  early  stages  of  development.  In  such  a 
constellation, any new legislation will not only increase the density of the field, but might also 14 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
increase policy intensity, assuming that the status quo was characterized by the absence of 
any governmental activities with regard to the policy item in question. 
For  more  established  policy  fields,  by  contrast,  this  linkage  is  less  likely.  It  is  rather 
conceivable that increases in density are accompanied by decreases in intensity and vice 
versa. Such trade-offs might occur, for instance, if a country is obliged by international law to 
introduce new legislation and seeks to compensate negatively affected domestic actors (e.g. 
private companies) by reducing other regulatory burdens in the policy area.  
Table 2 summarizes the  proposed dimensions and sub-dimensions of policy change and 
attaches a set of indicators to them. The latter are only broadly introduced at this point, as 
they have to be operationalized more specifically in the relevant research context. In section 
four, we introduce the specific operationalization for the example of clean air policy. 
Table 2: Dimensions and indicators of policy change 
Dimension    Indicators 
 
Policy density 
 
Policy target density 
 
Development of policies over time 
(Difference between number of adopted and 
abolished policies) 
  Policy instrument 
density 
Development of instruments over time 
(Difference between number of adopted and 
abolished instruments) 
 
 
Policy intensity 
 
Intensity level 
 
Development of policy instrument strictness 
over time 
(Difference between number and/ or degree 
measures with increasing and decreasing 
effects) 
  Intensity scope  Development of personal scope / 
substantive scope / temporal scope of a 
policy instrument over time 
(Difference between number and/ or degree 
measures with increasing and decreasing 
effects) 
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III.2.1 Conceptualizing policy change as change in policy density 
Broadly speaking, an increase in policy density points towards policy expansion, whereas a 
decrease  in  policy  density  can  be  interpreted  as  policy  dismantling.  Changes  in  policy 
density can be measured via two indicators – the number of policy targets and the number of 
policy instruments within a policy field. It generally holds that the larger the number of policy 
targets, the higher is the regulatory penetration of a policy field. For example, in order to 
reduce  air  pollution,  governments  can  define  a  plethora  of  regulatory  goals.  On  the  one 
hand, they can regulate the amount of pollutant emissions. The corresponding policy targets 
would then refer to the regulation of emissions of different substances. On the other hand, 
governments  can  also  adopt  policies  that  define  specific  air  quality  goals  with  regard  to 
various substances, e.g. particulate matter (see, e.g. Jordan et al. 2010). If the number of 
regulatory issues, i.e. policy targets or items, in a policy field increases, it indicates policy 
expansion, whereas policy dismantling becomes manifest in a decrease of the number of 
policy targets.   
The second indicator for measuring policy density is determined by the number of policy 
instruments in a given policy field. The number of policy instruments measures policy density 
on  a more concrete  level  than the number of policy targets. A change in the  number of 
instruments, however, does not necessarily coincide with a change in the number of policy 
targets. To reduce the amount of industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into the air, for 
instance,  governments  can  rely  upon  a  broad  array  and  combination  of  instruments, 
including  command-and-control  approaches  (the  definition  of  legally-binding  emission 
standards), economic incentives (such as environmental taxes or emission trading systems), 
or industrial self-regulation and voluntary agreements (see, e.g., Sterner 2002). Even if the 
number of policy targets in a given policy area remains constant over time, the number of 
policy instruments can hence increase or decrease.  
In sum, expansion in the dimension of policy density is measured by any increase in the 
number of policies and  instruments,  whereas any  decrease means policy  dismantling.  In 
other words, we measure the extent to which policy density expansion occurs by the addition 
of new policies or policy instruments and policy density dismantling by the abolishment of 
existing ones. 
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III.2.2 Conceptualizing policy change as change in policy intensity 
The  dimension  of  policy  intensity  captures  changes  in  the  stringency  of  governmental 
intervention in a policy field. An increase in intensity over time can accordingly be understood 
as policy expansion, whereas a decrease indicates policy dismantling. We measure changes 
in policy intensity by two indicators: the intensity level and the intensity scope. First, changes 
in policy intensity rest upon potential increases or reductions of regulatory standards such as 
the concrete level of permissible emissions. Second, changes in policy intensity refer to the 
scope of application of policy instruments. The intensity scope increases in conjunction with 
the number of cases, constellations, or addressees covered by a certain policy instrument. 
For  instance,  the  scope  of  an  emission  standard  regulating  certain  emissions  from 
combustion plants increases once the threshold defining the size of plants covered by the 
regulation  is  lowered.  In  this  case,  more  companies  would  be  covered  by  the  emission 
standard and would therefore have to comply with the respective legal obligations.  
The dimensions of policy density and intensity are useful for studying aggregate changes in 
policy  output  with  considerable  attention  to  detail.  In  particular,  they  allow  examining 
regulatory changes over entire policy fields. They are, naturally, less useful if the researcher 
is  interested  in  studying  regulatory  shifts  with  respect  to  particular  types  of  policy 
instruments,  for  example  a  shift  from  command-and-control  instruments  to  economic 
incentives. I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 17 
IV.   Operationalizing  changes  in  policy  density  and 
intensity: the case of clean air policy 
How can the proposed measurement concept be applied in practical research? This section 
answers this question by demonstrating a specific operationalization of changes in policy 
density  and  intensity  based  on  policy  outputs  for  the  case  of  clean  air  policy.  Our 
operationalization  is guided by the main purpose of testing  whether environmental policy 
outputs can be empirically related to environmental impacts. As discussed, most studies in 
the field that employ theories of policy change to explain environmental impacts assume that 
there is a direct relationship between them (see, e.g., Wälti 2004; Bernauer & Koubi 2009). 
But  does  this  assumption  bear  an  empirical  test  based  on  our  measurement  of  policy 
change?   
For  this  purpose,  the  operationalization  should,  above  all,  allow  for  an  encompassing 
measurement and comparison of developments in clean air policy-making across countries 
and over time. We measure clean air policy change as an aggregate count of all events of 
change in policy output coded according to the proposed measurement concept. In total, we 
study changes in clean air policy outputs in 24 OECD countries from 1976 to 2003 which 
have been compiled by the CONSENSUS project
2.  
To begin with, table 3 lists all policy targets considered to comprehensively assess changes 
in clean air policy. Overall, twenty policy targets are examined  that refer to both air quality 
and pollutant emissions as well as product standards. If one of the listed items becomes 
subject to regulatory intervention, we count it as one event of policy expansion. Conversely, 
if one of the items is not regulated anymore, we count this as an event of policy dismantling. 
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Table 3: Clean air policy targets 
Air quality 
1.  Air quality standards for nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
2.  Air quality standards for sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
3.  Air quality standard for carbon monoxide (CO) 
4.  Air quality standard for particulate matter 
5.  Air quality standard for ozone (O3) 
6. 
 
Air quality standard for lead 
 
Emissions (from stationary or mobile sources, product standards) 
7.  Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
8.  Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
9.  Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from heavy duty vehicles using diesel 
10.  Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
11.  Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
12.  Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from heavy duty vehicles using diesel 
13.  Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
14.  Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
15.  Carbon monoxide (CO) emissions from large combustion using coal 
16.  Carbon monoxide (CO) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
17.  Particulate matter emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
18.  Arsenic emissions from stationary sources 
19.  Maximum permissible limit for the lead content of gasoline 
20.  Maximum permissible limit for the sulphur content of diesel 
 
Second, we consider every instrument that is used to achi eve the underlying regulatory 
objective of each of the specified policy targets. The types of instruments examined are 
listed in table 4. Note that there can be several instruments of the same type, e.g. several 
technological prescriptions, in place to regulate a given policy target. Again, the introduction 
of a new instrument counts as an event of policy expansion whereas the abolishment of an 
existing instrument counts as an event of dismantling. 
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Table 4: Environmental policy instruments 
Instrument  Description 
Obligatory standard  A legally enforceable numerical standard, typically involving a 
measurement unit, e.g. mg/l 
Prohibition / ban  A  total  or  partial  prohibition/ban  on  certain  emissions, 
activities, products etc.  
Technological 
prescription 
A  measure  prescribing  the  use  of  a  specific  technology  or 
process 
Tax / levy  A tax or levy for a polluting product or activity 
Subsidy / tax reduction  A measure by which the state grants a financial advantage to 
a certain product or activity 
Liability scheme  A measure that allocates the costs of environmental damage 
to those who have caused the damage 
Planning instrument  A  measure  defining  areas  or  times  that  deserve  particular 
protection 
Public investment  A specific public investment  
Data collection/ 
monitoring programmes 
A specific programme for collecting data 
Information-based 
instrument 
Exchange of information between the state and polluters or 
among polluters 
Voluntary instrument  Voluntary agreements or commitments between the state and 
private actors or among private actors 
Permits  A  permit  to  pollute  the  environment  or  to 
produce/import/export/sell environmentally harmful products 
 
Finally, we count every change in the strictness and scope of an instrument as an event of 
either  policy  expansion  or  dismantling. Another  possibility  would  have  been  to  precisely 
quantify the changes in level and scope. We do not pursue this approach, however, because 
it is very difficult to make these changes comparable across policy instrument and countries 
over  time.  For  example,  we  cannot  readily  compare  the  levels  of  taxes  with  those  of 
emission standards. Another problem is represented by the fact that some jurisdictions prefer 
defining  specific  standards  for  individual  industry  sectors  whilst  others  prefer  to  define 
universal  standards  that  are  uniformly  valid  for  all  industry  sectors.  We  thus  deem  it 
conceptually more appropriate to adhere to an aggregate count of all events of change with 
expansive and dismantling effects. From this it follows that the final measure of aggregate 
policy change is composed of the difference between all expansive and dismantling events 
of  change  (see  table  1).  Density  change  consists  of  all  changes  in  policy  targets  and 
instruments and intensity change is measured in terms of changes in levels and scopes.  
Figure 1 illustrates clean air policy changes aggregated over all countries in our sample. The 
dashed line denotes the count of all events of policy expansion, whereas the solid line gives 
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measures of clean air policy density and intensity, i.e. cumulative change (expansion minus 
dismantling) over time. Dismantling activities in clean air policy-making do indeed exist for 
our country sample but are overall rather the exception. This leads to a continuous increase 
in  overall  policy  density  and  intensity,  i.e.  policy  expansion  discounted  of  dismantling. 
Moreover, both expansive and dismantling activities in terms of clean air policy intensity are 
more frequent than density changes (see, Hall 1993). They also increase towards the end of 
our observational period, suggesting that policy-makers focus increasingly on the intensity 
dimension as policy fields grow more mature. 
Figure 1: Clean air policy change in 24 OECD countries. 
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V.   Explaining air pollutant emissions by clean air policies 
This  section  finally  examines  whether  environmental  policy  output  can  help  to  explain 
environmental impacts. In fact, this is the implicit, and hardly tested, assumption made by 
studies  that  use  theories  of  policy  change  to  explain  changes  in  environmental  impacts. 
Empirically, we focus on clean air policy, and in particular whether clean air policies in terms 
of output can be related to emission levels of pollutants. 
 
V.1   Introducing the variables 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min.  Max. 
CO2  CO2 emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
17.839  .415  16.691  18.600 
SO2   SO2 emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
12.369  .999  9.631  13.947 
NOX  NOX emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
12.243  .611  10.564  13.913 
Policy density  Clean air policy density  19.875  18.672  0  88 
Policy 
intensity 
Clean air policy intensity  21.590  23.019  0  114 
GDP pc  GDP per capita (2000 US$, log)  9.627  .595  7.794  10.559 
GDP growth  Annual GDP growth  2.930  2.599  -6.854  11.494 
Population 
density 
Population density (people per 
sqkm of land area) 
133.978  132.285  1.826  494.411 
Urban 
population 
Urban population (% of total 
population) 
71.802  11.921  41.2  97.22 
Industry  Industrial added value (% of total 
GDP) 
31.768  4.867  19.034  42.623 
Trade intensity  Imports + exports (% of GDP)  60.607  29.224  9.102  184.742 
Manufactures 
exports 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
68.321  21.785  9.361  96.558 
Manufactures 
imports 
Manufactures imports (% of 
merchandise imports) 
68.932  12.437  18.315  87.438 
FDI inflow  Foreign direct investment net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
2.017  5.073  -.663  92.498 
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Our dependent variables are national emission intensities, i.e. emissions in grams per unit of 
GDP  (see,  Cao  &  Prakash  2010),  of  three  frequently  used  air  pollutants,  namely  CO2, 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX). The emission data were gathered from the 
Emissions  Database  for  Global Atmospheric  Research  (EDGAR)
3. A summary of all key 
variables is presented in table 5. 
To  begin  with,  our  core  explanatory  variables  refer  to  the  effect  of  regulatory  activity 
measured in terms of clean air policy density ( Policy density) and intensity (Policy intensity) 
as  introduced  earlier.  In  general,  we  expect  emission  intensities  to  decrease  with  more 
dense and more intense clean air regulations and vice versa. Since the two dimensions are 
highly correlated for clean air policy, we build separate models around them.  
We test the effect of clean air regulations on emission intensities against several control 
variables.  First,  following  the  reasoning  of  the  so-called  environmental  Kuznets  curve, 
demand and supply of environmental policies are expected increase at higher income levels, 
which might finally also lead to lower emissions (see, e.g., Selden & Song 1994; Grossman 
& Krueger 1995; Aubourg et al. 2008). Moreover, economic downturns can be responsible 
for  reductions  in  pollution  loads  (Hughes  &  Lovei  1999).  Contrary  to  this  expectation, 
however,  economic  upswings  can  also  boost  investment  in  more  advanced  and 
environmentally friendly technologies. We control for these factors by including the natural 
log of GDP per capita (GDP pc) and the growth rate of GDP in our models (GDP growth). 
Apart  from  these  general  economic  conditions,  the  structural  composition  of  national 
economies should have an impact on emission levels. In particular, the industrial sector can 
be  expected  to  contribute  above  average  to  overall  pollution  (see,  e.g.  Earnhart  &  Lizal 
2008). We therefore control for the size of the industrial sector via its contribution to total 
GDP (Industry). 
Another  set  of  controls  refers  to  the  effects  of  international  trade.  First,  we  control  for 
differences in overall trade intensity, measured as exports plus import as a percentage of 
GDP.  Higher  levels  of  trade  can  be  assumed  to  either  exert  downward  pressures  on 
environmental standards (Prakash & Potoski 2006) or induce convergence towards higher 
levels of environmental standards (Vogel 1995). We also use two more specific controls that 
capture effects emanating from differential patterns of international trade, namely the share 
of manufactures exports and manufactures imports. Since the production of manufactured 
goods  is  known  to  be  particularly  pollution  intense,  the  standard  theory  of  regulatory 
competition would predict laxer regulation and hence higher emission intensities, particularly 
for  countries  that  rely  more  heavily  on  manufacture  exports.  The  alternative  scenario, 
however, is that increased competition from manufacture imports and exports has positive 
effects if domestic firms move towards more environmentally efficient product and production 
technologies  (Perkins  &  Neumayer  2008).  By  the  same  token,  beneficial  technology 
                                                       
3 Available at: http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 23 
spillovers can be expected at higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. We 
therefore also include net FDI inflow in our model. 
Finally, in accordance  with previous studies,  we control for population density and urban 
population in order to rule out confounding effects related to demographics. All independent 
variables,  except  for  our  output  measures,  are  derived  from  the  World  Bank‘s  World 
Development Indicators. 
 
V.2   Discussion of main findings 
We estimate the relationship between emission intensities and the discussed explanatory 
variables by means of standard panel analysis techniques. As customary in the literature, all 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. We include country fixed-effects in our analyses 
because  we  are  interested  in  the  effects  of  changes  in  environmental  policy  output  on 
environmental impacts rather than in the effects of country-differences in regulatory levels. 
This  way,  we  are  also  able  to  control  for  unobserved  country-level  heterogeneity  and  to 
ensure that the results are not driven by particular countries (Kittel & Winner 2005). In our 
first  set  of  models,  reported  in  table  5,  we  use  panel-corrected  standard  errors  with 
corrections  for  first-order  autocorrelation  to  correct  for  disturbances  arising  from  cross-
sectional  heteroskedasticity,  contemporaneous  correlation,  and  temporal  autocorrelation 
(Beck & Katz 1995). We first do not include a lagged dependent variable as it is likely to 
absorb any trend in our dependent variables (Plümper et al. 2005). 
Our  first  findings  show  that  policy  outputs  have  overall  a  significant  negative  effect  on 
emission intensities. In other words, higher levels of clean air policy density and intensity are 
associated  lower  levels  of  emission  intensities,  suggesting  that  a  positive  effect  of 
environmental regulatory efforts exists in the countries under study. Only in the case of CO2 
emissions, the coefficient for policy density does not reach statistical significance. 
As  regards  the  control  variables,  our  results  confirm most  of  the  discussed  expectations 
based on previous research. While emission intensities for all three pollutants decrease at 
higher levels of per capita income in a country, periods of strong economic growth increase 
emission intensities for CO2 and SO2. Moreover, as expected, higher shares of value added 
by industrial production significantly increase emission intensities, at least in five out of six 
models. Urbanization also has a significant positive effect on emissions, whereas increases 
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Table 6: Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in levels. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  CO2  CO2  SO2  SO2  NOX  NOX 
              Policy density  -0.0002    -0.0029**    -0.0017**   
  (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Policy intensity    -0.0012***    -0.0055***    -0.0030*** 
    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
GDP pc  -0.7360***  -0.6844***  -1.7159***  -1.5500***  -1.1387***  -1.0507*** 
  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.164)  (0.165)  (0.115)  (0.115) 
GDP growth  0.0021*  0.0019*  0.0052**  0.0044*  0.0018  0.0014 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Population density  -0.0019  -0.0017  -0.0109***  -0.0101***  -0.0033  -0.0029 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Urban population  0.0261***  0.0250***  0.0446***  0.0406***  0.0388***  0.0362*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Industry  0.0040**  0.0026  0.0337***  0.0290***  0.0128***  0.0102*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Trade intensity  -0.0015**  -0.0013**  -0.0054***  -0.0047***  -0.0025**  -0.0021** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Manufactures exports  0.0007  0.0007  0.0025  0.0025  -0.0013  -0.0013 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Manufactures imports  -0.0012  -0.0011  -0.0044**  -0.0038*  -0.0005  -0.0003 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FDI inflow  0.0004  0.0006  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0000  0.0002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
             
Constant  23.3096***  22.9283***  25.8002***  24.6267***  20.9237***  20.3431*** 
  (0.555)  (0.566)  (1.362)  (1.434)  (1.045)  (1.021) 
R
2  0.999  0.999  0.987  0.987  0.995  0.995 
N/Countries  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24 
              Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed-effects are not reported. All independent variables lagged one 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Interestingly  enough,  higher  levels  of  overall  trade  are  associated  with  lower  emission 
intensities for all three pollutants. At the same time, levels of FDI inflow cannot be associated 
with emission intensities. Together, these findings counter the pollution haven scenario and 
rather point to a beneficial effect of economic integration on environmental quality, at least 
among  OECD  countries.  With  regard  to  the  more  specific  characteristics  of  trade  in  our 
models,  we  can  only  find  a  significant  reduction  in  SO2  emissions  at  higher  levels  of 
manufactures imports, whereas exports of manufactures do not seem to have a systematic 
effect on emission intensities. In accordance with previous research, this finding could be 
explained  by  environmental  efficiency  enhancing  technology  and  knowledge  spillovers, 
which  should  be  particularly  high  for  imports  of  advanced  capital  goods  (Perkins  & 
Neumayer 2008). 
We next check the robustness of our findings by including a lagged dependent variable, 
which is the widely used alternative to deal with serial correlation and to model dynamic 
processes. By including a lagged dependent variable, we effectively assume that current 
emission levels can be explained by emission levels in the previous period. Beck and Katz 
(2011:  342)  also  recommend  this  procedure  for  fixed-effects  specifications,  since  it 
outperforms instrumental variable approaches in time-series with more than twenty periods. 
The results reported  in table 7 show that policy density  and  intensity do not  turn out  as 
significant  predictors  of  emission  intensity  levels.  Instead,  our  findings  suggest  that  the 
yearly  adjustments  in  emission  intensities  modelled  by  the  lagged  dependent  variable 
approach can best be explained by per capita income and urbanization. More specifically, 
increases in per capita  income lead to lower emission levels of CO2 and NOX, whereas 
urbanization  leads  to  increases  in  these  emissions.  As  regards  SO2  emissions,  the 
coefficients for both variables are not significant. Moreover, increasing shares of industrial 
production  increase  emission  levels  of  SO2  and  NOX,  but  not  CO2.  The  results  also 
moderately support that increasing trade volumes tend to limit CO2 and SO2 emissions. 
Overall, our lagged dependent variable models cast first doubts on the causal relationship 
between changes in clean air policies and air pollutant emissions. In particular, periodical 
adjustments in emission intensities do not seem to follow directly from changes in regulatory 
activity. 
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Table 7: Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in levels including a lagged dependent variable. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  CO2  CO2  SO2  SO2  NOX  NOX 
              Policy density  0.0000    0.0002    -0.0002   
  (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)   
Policy intensity    -0.0002    -0.0003    -0.0004 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP pc  -0.0748***  -0.0676***  -0.0967  -0.0827  -0.1622***  -0.1597*** 
  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.049)  (0.045) 
GDP growth  -0.0026**  -0.0027**  -0.0029  -0.0030  -0.0041**  -0.0042** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Population density  -0.0008*  -0.0008  -0.0024**  -0.0024**  -0.0005  -0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Urban population  0.0044***  0.0044***  0.0060  0.0060  0.0051**  0.0052** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Industry  0.0002  -0.0003  0.0059***  0.0051**  0.0053***  0.0049*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Trade intensity  -0.0007**  -0.0007*  -0.0014*  -0.0013*  -0.0006  -0.0005 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Manufactures exports  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0006  -0.0007 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Manufactures imports  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0003  0.0007  0.0007 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FDI inflow  0.0004  0.0005  0.0007  0.0009  0.0002  0.0003 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
             
Lagged DV  0.8548***  0.8533***  0.9173***  0.9163***  0.8778***  0.8734*** 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Constant  3.0556***  3.0211***  1.4303*  1.3217*  2.5790***  2.6144*** 
  (0.668)  (0.647)  (0.789)  (0.803)  (0.616)  (0.571) 
R
2  0.986  0.986  0.989  0.989  0.988  0.988 
N/Countries  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24  632/24 
              Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed-effects are not reported. All independent variables lagged one 
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Table 8. Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in first-differences. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Δ CO2  Δ CO2  Δ SO2  Δ SO2  Δ NOX  Δ NOX 
              Δ Policy density  -0.0003    0.0005    -0.0001   
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Δ Policy intensity    -0.0004    -0.0005    -0.0004 
    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Δ GDP pc  -0.4078***  -0.4049***  -0.3225  -0.3146  -0.4805**  -0.4772** 
  (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.266)  (0.267)  (0.213)  (0.213) 
Δ GDP growth  0.0004  0.0004  -0.0018  -0.0019  -0.0017  -0.0017 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Δ Population density  -0.0012  -0.0012  -0.0146**  -0.0145**  -0.0073  -0.0072 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Δ Urban population  0.0151  0.0147  0.0644***  0.0633***  0.0483***  0.0477*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Δ Industry  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0016  -0.0016  -0.0055  -0.0055 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Δ Trade intensity  -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0007  0.0007  0.0005  0.0005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ Manufactures exports  0.0005  0.0005  0.0017  0.0017  -0.0008  -0.0008 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Δ Manufactures imports  -0.0007  -0.0007  0.0013  0.0013  0.0011  0.0011 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ FDI inflow  0.0006  0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
             
Lagged DV  -0.0022  -0.0014  -0.0526  -0.0505  -0.1044  -0.1047 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Constant  -0.0105*  -0.0102*  -0.0698***  -0.0682***  -0.0345***  -0.0338*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
R
2  0.118  0.118  0.103  0.103  0.105  0.105 
N/Countries  607/24  607/24  607/24  607/24  607/24  607/24 
              Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables lagged one year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 28 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
Further to unit heterogeneity and autocorrelation, which we have dealt with in our first two 
regressions,  panel  analysts  need  to  worry  about  nonstationarities.  Particularly  if  the 
dependent variable is nonstationary, this usually creates an additional source of bias and 
might lead to falsely confirming relationships that are spurious. Testing for unit roots in our 
dependent variables by means of Im-Pesaran-Shin tests (results not reported), we confirm 
that our emission data are, except for CO2, indeed subject to significant trends. Since the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and panel corrected standard errors alone cannot 
deal with nonstationarities, we rely moreover on a dynamic specification in first-differences 
(see Kittel & Winner 2005). Results of the first-difference models are reported in table 8. We 
do  not  include  country-fixed-effects,  because  first-differencing  the  variables  has  removed 
most of the cross-country variation. 
The results of the first-difference models reveal that changes in clean air regulation do not 
remain a significant predictor of changing emission intensities. Still, with the exception of 
policy density in the case of SO2 emissions, the coefficients of our clean air policy output 
measures turn out with the expected signs. Less robust are the results for the variables 
measuring a country‘s reliance on industrial production and trade, which both turn out with 
insignificant coefficients and for the most part even with reversed signs.  
Judged  by  the  first-difference  models,  the  most  robust  predictors  of  emission  intensities 
remain changes in GDP per capita  with increases leading to lower emissions and urban 
population, where increases are associated with higher emissions. Yet, there is also some 
variation across the different pollutants under study. Per capita increases in GDP are not a 
significant predictor of SO2 emission intensities anymore while urbanization does not have a 
significant effect on CO2 emissions. These differences suggest that it may well matter for 
conclusions reached by impact data which particular pollutant is studied. 
In  summary,  the  initial  analyses  in  this  article  suggest  that  clean  air  regulations,  i.e. 
environmental policy output, cannot be easily associated with environmental impacts. Put 
differently, increases in clean air policy density and intensity do not translate directly into 
decreases  of  emission  intensities. The  downside  of  this  finding  is  that  theories  of  policy 
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VI.   Concluding remarks 
In  this  article  we  have  developed  a  new  measurement  concept  of  policy  change  that  is 
suitable to study detailed changes in public policy-making in policy fields. To this end, we 
introduced the dimensions of policy  density  and policy intensity. The  dimension of policy 
density is composed of the policy targets and policy instruments that populate a policy field 
and thereby measures the legislative penetration and regulatory differentiation of the field. 
Policy intensity, by contrast, refers to the strictness of these measures by considering the 
concrete calibrations of policy instruments in terms of their levels and scopes of application. 
While these dimensions imply a necessary simplification with regard to the various aspects 
of policy change, they advance the state of art as they enable the systematic measurement 
and comparison of policy reforms over various policy fields or subfields, and countries with 
considerable attention to detail. 
We  have  illustrated  the  application  of  our  measurement  concept  with  an  example  from 
environmental policy research where the study and explanation of environmental impact data 
dominates the field. We focused on clean air policy as a particularly popular subfield. In a 
second step, we evaluated whether clean policy outputs can explain emission intensities of 
well-known pollutants. Such a relationship is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
using  environmental  impact  data  to  study  theories  of  policy  change.  The  results  of  our 
analysis show that clean air regulations have no straightforward effect on emission levels of 
major air pollutants. As a consequence, we conclude that environmental impacts are not 
necessarily a reliable proxy for environmental policy change. 
This finding has several  implications for future research. First, our findings  underline the 
general need for a more cautious approach when measuring policy change. In particular, the 
theoretical consequences  of selecting a specific measurement approach should be more 
critically  reflected.  In  this  article,  we  have  discussed  issues  pertaining  to  environmental 
impact  data  such  as  uncertain  reliability  resulting  from  largely  unknown  data  generation 
processes and issues of unknown lag structures. Second, and most important, the results 
suggest that a more promising way to study policy change and its theories is to rely on the 
direct measurement of policy outputs. 
That said, we should also like to emphasize that a focus on environmental impacts can still 
be a reasonable choice if the analyst is interested in testing grand theories of change at the 
macro  level. After  all,  environmental  regulations  should  lead  to  decreases  in  pollution  if 
implemented  successfully.  In  other  words,  implementation  effectiveness  could  be  the 
‗missing link‘ between policy outputs and impacts in our analyses, which we did not model. 
Yet, a certain degree of implementation effectiveness is also a necessary condition in studies 
testing policy change theories by means of environmental impact data. In this context, our 
analyses merely show that this necessary condition cannot be simply presumed. 30 — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change — I H S 
In  fact,  a  systematic  investigation  of  the  linkage  between  changes  in  policy  outputs  and 
changes in policy impacts could also inspire a new generation of large-n implementation 
studies.  So  far,  however,  implementation  studies  are  typically  based  on  small-n  designs, 
given the need for a detailed assessment of certain processes and causal factors involved 
during  the  implementation  stage,  and  hence  serious  practical  restrictions  regarding  the 
gathering data for a larger numbers of cases. The collection of data on policy outputs and 
impacts,  however,  could  offer  a  promising  starting  point  for  large-n  investigations  of 
implementation effectiveness. 
Finally, we would like to point out that this contribution is only an initial step to stimulate a 
more lively academic discussion about policy change in environmental policy research. Such 
a debate,  while  being  quite advanced  in social policy  research (see, e.g., Pierson 2001; 
Green-Pedersen 2004; Clasen & Siegel 2007; Carsten 2011), has so far hardly taken place 
in  environmental  policy  research. To  be  sure,  also  our  approach  is  subject  to  numerous 
empirical limitations with respect to the size of the country sample and the restricted focus on 
clean  air  policy.  Despite  these  limitations,  however,  we  are  confident  that  the  direct 
measurement  of  governmental  activity  represents  a  step  into  the  right  direction  for 
integrating the theoretical literature on policy change with large-n empirical studies. I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 31 
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